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Abstract
We prove a theorem stating that any semantics can be encoded as a compositional semantics,
which means that, essentially, the standard definition of compositionality is formally vacuous.
We then show that when compositional semantics is required to be ”systematic” (that is, the
meaning function cannot be arbitrary, but must belong to some class), it is possible to distinguish
between compositional and non-compositional semantics. As a result, we believe that the paper
clarifies the concept of compositionality and opens a possibility of making systematic formal
comparisons of different systems of grammars.
1 Introduction
Compositionality is defined as the property that the meaning of a whole is a function of the
meaning of its parts (cf. e.g. [Keenan and Faltz1985], pp.24-25). (A slightly less general definition,
e.g. [Partee et al.1990], postulates the existence of a homomorphism from syntax to semantics).
However, we can prove a theorem stating that any semantics can be encoded as a compositional
semantics, which means that, essentially, the standard definition of compositionality is formally
vacuous. Thus, although intuitively clear, the definition is not restrictive enough. We illustrate the
power of the theorem by showing how to assign compositional semantics to idioms and to a very
counterintuitive semantics of coordination (Section 4).
Given a class of functions F , we say that the compositional semantics is systematic if the mean-
ing function belongs to the class F . We show that when compositional semantics is required to be
systematic we can distinguish between grammars with compositional and non-compositional seman-
tics; we present an example of a simple grammar for which there is no ”systematic” compositional
semantics (Section 3).
As a result, we believe that the paper clarifies the concept of compositionality and opens a
possibility of making systematic comparisons of different systems of grammars and natural language
understanding programs. Furthermore, the concept of systematicity that we introduce in the paper
might be useful in extracting the formal meaning behind various versions of compositionality as a
philosophical principle, cf.[Partee1982]. But in this paper we restrict ourselves to the mathematics
of compositionality.
Compositional semantics is usually defined as a functional dependence of the meaning of an
expression on the meanings of its parts. One of the first natural questions we might want to ask
is whether a set of natural language expressions, i.e. a language, can have some compositional
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semantics. This question has been answered positively by [van Benthem1982]. However his result
says nothing about what kinds of things should be assigned e.g. to nouns, where, obviously,
we would like nouns to be mapped into sets of entities, or something like that. That is, we
want semantics to encode some basic intuitions, e.g. that nouns denote sets of entities, and verbs
denote relations between entities, and so on; in other words, we would like to have a compositional
semantics that agrees with intuitions. More formally, the questions is whether after deciding what
sentences and their parts mean, we can find a function that would compose the meaning of a whole
from the meanings of its parts.
The answer to this question is somewhat disturbing. It turns out that whatever we decide that
some language expressions should mean, it is always possible to produce a function that would give
compositional semantics to it (see below for a more precise formulation of this fact). The upshot
is that compositionality, as commonly defined, is not a strong constraint on a semantic theory.
2 Proving the existence of compositional semantics
Let S be any collection of expressions (intuitively, sentences and their parts). Assume that elements
of S (e.g. s.t) are composed from other elements of S (that is, s and t) by concatenation (”.”).
We do not assume that concatenation is associative, that is (a.(b.c)) = ((a.b).c). Intuitively, this
means that we assign semantics to parse trees, and not to strings of words.
Let M be a set of meanings, and let for any s ∈ S, m(s) ∈M be the meaning of s. We want to
show that there is a compositional semantics for S which agrees with the function m associating s
with m(s).
Since elements of M can be of any type, we do not automatically have m(s.t) = m(s)♯m(t),
where ♯ is some operation on the meanings. To get that kind of homomorphism we have to perform
a type raising operation that would map elements of S into functions and then the functions into the
required meanings. Note that such a type raising operation is quite common both in mathematics
(e.g. 1 being a function equal to 1 for all values) and in mathematical linguistics. The meaning
function µ that we want to define will provide compositional semantics for S by mapping it into a
set of functions in such a way that µ(s.t) = µ(s)(µ(t)), for all elements s.t of S.
Secondly, we want that the original semantics be easily decoded from µ(s). There is more
than one way of doing this. One can trivially extend the language S by adding to it an ”end of
expression” character $, which may appear only as the last element of any expression. The purpose
of it is to encode the function m(x) in the following way: µ(s.$) = m(s), for all s in S. Intuitively,
the character $ is like the period at the end of a sentence, or the pause marking the end of an
utterance. In effect, we will be treating all sentences as idioms, or garden path sentences, where
the meanings are clear only once the sentence is completed (Theorem 2). But, as we are going to
show now, the original semantics can be encoded in a different way, without extending the original
language, e.g. by assuring µ(s)(s) = m(s), for all s in S (Theorem 1).
To make the notation simple, we have assumed that there is only one way of composing elements
of S, by concatenation, but all our arguments work for languages with many operators as well. We
show an example of how such operators can be handled in Section 4.
THEOREM 1. Let M be an arbitrary set. Let A be an arbitrary alphabet. Let ”.” be a
binary operation, and let S be the set closure of A under ”.”. Let m : S → M be an arbitrary
function.
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Then there is a set of functions M∗ and a unique map µ : S →M∗ such that for all s, t ∈ S
µ(s.t) = µ(s)(µ(t)), and µ(s)(s) = m(s).
Corollary 2. Theorem 1 is also true when the binary operation ”.” is partial.
Preliminaries to the proof: The solution lemma
Our results will be proved in set theory with the anti-foundation axiom. This set theory, ZFA, is
equiconsistent with the standard system of ZFC, thus the theorem does not assume anything more
than what is needed for ”standard mathematical practice”. Furthermore, ZFA is better suited as
foundations for semantics of natural language than ZFC ([Barwise and Etchemendy1987]).
We need only one (but fundamental) theorem of ZFA: the solution lemma ([Aczel1987] and
[Barwise and Etchemendy1987]), which says any (well-formed) collection of equations that define
sets has a unique solution. For the reader who is not familiar with set theory, the meaning of the
solution lemma can be explained as follows: We have a universe of sets V , and a set of variables
X = {x1, x2, ...}, which may be infinite (countable or uncountable). We can form equations of the
form
xi = a set(X,V )
where a set(X,V ) is a set expression involving the variables and elements of V , for instance, if
a ∈ V and b ∈ V , we can write the following equations:
x7 = {{a}, x7, x9}
x8 = {b, {a, x8}, {{{x79}}}}
x9 = {b}
x79 = {x79}
We say that such a set is well-formed if each variable appear only once on the left, and each left
hand side is a variable. The solution lemma says that any set of such equations (finite or infinite)
has a unique solution. That is, there is a unique collection of sets that satisfy them. ✷
Proof of Theorem 1 and Corollary 2
Proof of Theorem 1. It is enough to ensure that for all s ∈ S
µ(s) = {< s,m(s) >} ∪ {< µ(t), µ(s.t) > : t ∈ S}
Clearly, µ is a function, because it is a collection of pairs. The proof is complete once we check
that for s’s and t’s in S we have (i) µ(s.t) = µ(s)(µ(t)) , and (ii) µ(s)(s) = m(s) . Using the above
equality we check (i): If f = µ(s), then f(µ(t)) = µ(s.t). Similarly for (ii).
It remains to show that using the solution lemma we can make the above equation true for all
s ∈ S. We begin by introducing a set variable Xs for every s ∈ S, and observing that
Xs = {< s,m(s) >} ∪ {< Xt,Xs.t > : t ∈ S}
is a well-formed set equation for any s ∈ S. (The pair < a, b > is set theoretically defined as
{{a}, {a, b}}). Hence the solution lemma applies, and there are unique sets µ(s) that satisfy each
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equation. But each such µ(s) is a collection of pairs, i.e. a function. Furthermore, since each µ(s)
is unique, and S is a set, the mapping µ associating µ(s) with each s ∈ S is a function. This
completes the proof of Theorem 1.
✷
Proof of Corollary 2. It is enough to observe that we can add an extra condition in the main
equation of Theorem 1, and the proof still works:
µ(s) = {< s,m(s) >} ∪ {< µ(t), µ(s.t) > : t ∈ S and s.t ∈ S}
✷
note. Notice that we can view using the solution lemma in the above proofs as an extreme
example of defining a function by cases. To see it more clearly, one can make the main equation
of the proof of Theorem 1 explicit. Let t(0), t(1), . . . , t(α) enumerate S. We can create a big
table specifying meaning values for all strings and their combinations. Then the conditions on the
meaning functions µ(s) can be written as the set of equations below
µ(t(0)) = {< t(0),m(t(0)) >,< µ(t(0)), µ(t(0).t(0)) >, . . . ,
< µ(t(α)), µ(t(0).t(α)) >, . . .}
µ(t(1)) = {< t(1),m(t(1)) >,< µ(t(0)), µ(t(1).t(0)) >, . . . ,
< µ(t(α)), µ(t(1).t(α)) >, . . .}
. . .
µ(t(α)) = {< t(α),m(t(α)) >,< µ(t(0)), µ(t(α).t(0)) >, . . . ,
< µ(t(α)), µ(t(α).t(α)) >, . . .}
. . .
In ordinary mathematics, this would correspond to saying that if x is 1 then f(x) = 32, if x is 2
then f(x) = 14732, if x is 3 then f(x) = 1, and so on. Clearly, such a process defines the function
f , but, intuitively, it is not a definition we would care much for. Before showing that requiring a
better description of an f than as a set of pairs makes sense, we want to observe that the encoding
of the original meaning function can be uniform in the following sense:
PROPOSITION 3. In addition to the assumptions of Theorem 1, let $ /∈ A, and let S$ be
the language obtained by the mapping s → s.$, for all s ∈ S. Then there is a set of functions M∗
and a unique map µ : S$→M∗ such that for all s, t ∈ S
µ(s.t) = µ(s)(µ(t)), and µ(s.$) = m(s).
Proof. As in the proof of Corollary 2, we can change the set of equations to
µ(s) = {< $,m(s) >} ∪ {< µ(t), µ(s.t) > : t ∈ S}
To finish the construction of µ, we make sure that the equation µ($) = $ holds. Formally, this
requires adding the pair < $, $ > into the graph of µ that was obtained from the solution lemma.
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Also, we have to extend the domain of function µ to include S$. This is easily done by adding to
the already constructed part of µ the set of pairs {< s.$,m(s) >: s ∈ S}. The proof is complete
once we check that for s’s in S we have µ(s.$) = m(s), and that µ(s.$) = µ(s)(µ($)) (because
µ($) = $, and, according to the equation, µ(s)($) = m(s)).
✷
Note that, as in Corollary 2, if a certain string does not belong to the language, we can assume
that the corresponding value in this table is undefined; thus µ is not necessarily defined for all
possible concatenations of strings of S.
In view of the above theorems, any semantics is equivalent to a compositional semantics, and
hence it would be meaningless to keep the definition of compositionality as the existence of a ho-
momorphism from syntax to semantics without imposing some conditions on this homomorphism.
Notice that requiring the computability of the meaning function will not do. In mathematics, where
semantics obviously is compositional, we can talk about noncomputable functions, and it is usually
clear what we postulate about them. Also, we have the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 4. If the set of expressions S and the original meaning function m(x) are
computable, then so is the meaning function µ(x).
Proof. One can easily check that the table defining the meaning functions µ(t(α)) in the note
above is effectively computable from the functions m(x) and t(α). Hence so is the function µ. ✷
note. What does it mean that the table is effectively computable from the functions m(x)
and t(α)? It means that given a Turing machine, T1, that prints all elements of S, and another
Turing machine, T2, that takes an element s on the output tape of T1 as input and produces as
output m(s), we can construct a third Turing machine, T3, that produces the successive elements
of the table, i.e. enumerates all the equations (e.g. for any pair < m,n > gives the nth value pair
of the mth equation). But these equations define our function µ. Hence µ is effectively computable.
Also, notice that the proposition holds true for generalized computability, in the sense of [Barwise1975].
3 Systematic semantics. I. Examples
[Hirst1987], pp.27, talks about compositionality, postulating that the meaning of a whole should
be a ”systematic” function of the meanings of the parts. He does not define the word ”systematic”
except as being an antonym to ”idiosyncratic”. What it could mean is that we want to avoid such
meaning functions as the ones defined in the proof of Theorem 1 and the subsequent propositions.
We suggest a simple way of doing it — by requiring that the meaning function belong to a certain
class. By Proposition 4 this does not work if we merely postulate that the function be computable.
However it does work for smaller classes of functions as the following examples show.
A simple grammar without a systematic semantics
If meanings have to be expressed using certain natural, but restricted, sets of operations, it may
turn out that even simple grammars do not have a compositional semantics. Consider two gram-
mars of numerals in base 10:
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Grammar ND
N ← N D
N ← D
D ← 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9
Grammar DN
N ← D N
N ← D
D ← 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9
PROPOSITION 5. For the grammar ND, the meaning of any numeral can be expressed in
the model (Nat,+, ∗, 10) as
µ(ND) = 10 ∗ µ(N) + µ(D)
that is, a polynomial in two variables with coefficients in natural numbers.
✷
On the other hand, for the grammar DN, we can prove that no such a polynomial exists:
THEOREM 6. There is no polynomial p in two variables x, y such that
µ(DN) = p(µ(D), µ(N))
and such that the value of µ(DN) is the number expressed by the string DN in base 10.
Proof. We are looking for
µ(DN) = p(µ(D), µ(N))
= µ(D) ∗ 10length(N) + µ(N)
where the function p must be a polynomial in these two variables. If such a polynomial exists,
it would have to be equal to µ(N) for µ(N) in the interval 0..9, and to µ(D) ∗ 10 + µ(N) for
µ(N) in 10..99, and to µ(D) ∗ 100 + µ(N) for µ(N) in 100..999, and so on. Let the degree of
this polynomial be less than n , for some n. Let us consider the interval 10n..10(n+1) − 1. On
this interval the polynomial would have to be equal identically to µ(D) ∗ 10n + µ(N). Now, if
two polynomials of degrees less than n agree on n different values, they must be identical. Hence,
p(µ(N), µ(D)) = µ(D) ∗ 10n + µ(N). But this would give wrong values for other intervals, e.g
10..99. Contradiction.
✷
But notice that there is a compositional semantics for the grammar DN that does not agree with
intuitions: µ(DN) = 10 ∗µ(N)+µ(D), which corresponds to reading the number backwards. And
there are many other semantics corresponding to all possible polynomials in µ(D) and µ(N). Also
observe that (a) if we specify enough values of the meaning function we can exclude any particular
polynomial; (b) if we do not restrict the degree of the polynomial, we can write one that would
give any values we want on a finite number of words in the grammar. The moral is that not only
it is natural to restrict meaning functions to, say, polynomials, but to further restrict them. E.g. if
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we restrict the meaning functions to polynomials of degree 1, then by specifying only three values
of the meaning function we can (a) have a unique compositional semantics for the first grammar;
and (b) show that there is no compositional semantics for the second grammar (directly from the
proof of the above theorem).
4 Some linguistic examples
In this section we want to explain how the theorems we proved in Section 2 apply to typical lin-
guistic examples. In the process we also explain how languages with operators can be handled by
our method. We begin by discussing the simple case of idioms.
Idioms. Intuitively, the meaning of ”high seas” is not compositional, because ”high” refers to
length or distance, and not to open spaces; moreover one could even argue that although ”seas”
is plural, ”high seas” is semantically singular, for it means an ”open sea”. (However, the precise
semantics of the expression is not important at this point). We want to show how we can assign
compositional semantics to such non-compositional examples.
Let the language S consist of wall, seas, high, high.wall, and high.seas. The equations we need
to ensure the compositionality of semantics have the familiar form:
µ(seas) = {< seas,m(seas) >}
µ(wall) = {< wall,m(wall) >}
µ(high) = {< high,m(high) >,< µ(wall), µ(high.wall) >,
< µ(seas), µ(high.seas) >}
µ(high.seas) = {< (high.seas), open(m(sea)) >}
µ(high.wall) = {< (high.wall), high(m(wall)) >}
Notice, that we could add building and other words to the language and easily extend this set of
equations. The intuition we associate with compositionality would be captured by the uniformity
of the meanings of high.X as high(m(X)), where X ranges over wall, building, .... However the
formal expression of this intuition as the principle of compositionality does not work, which can be
seen by noticing that the meaning of high.seas is a composition of the meaning functions for high
and seas. What is happening has to do with the fact that, by definition, functions defined by cases
are as good as any others. And what we have done is to have defined the meaning of high by cases.
Coordination. We now turn our attention to a slightly more complicated example. Consider
disjunction and conjunction, + and &. We plan to prove the following results:
PROPOSITION 7. Let + and & denote ”or” and ”and”. Then:
(A). It is possible to assign compositionally the ”natural” semantics of (a+ b)&c to expressions of
type a+ (b&c) and preserve the original meanings of a+ b and b&c.
(B). (A) is not possible if the meaning functions have to be Boolean polynomials.
Proof. To keep things as simple as possible, consider language S consisting of a+ (b&c), b&c, b, c,
and a. To apply directly the solution lemma we should represent the operators in their prefix form;
e.g. a+ b becomes +.a.b. Then our language S becomes +.a.&.b.c, &.b.c, +, &, b, c, and a. (And
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for the sake of completeness we can add to it a.&.b.c, and b.c). As before we write our equations
(this time using the version with $):
µ(+.a.&.b.c) = {< $, (m(a) +m(b))&m(c) >}
µ(a.&.b.c) = {< $, < a,m(b)&m(c) >>}
µ(&.b.c) = {< $,m(b)&m(c) >}
µ(b.c) = {< $, < m(b),m(c) >>}
µ(b) = {< $,m(b) >,< µ(c), µ(b.c) >}
µ(&) = {< $,m(&) >,< µ(b.c), µ(&.b.c) >}
µ(a) = {< $,m(a) >,< µ(&.b.c), µ(a.&.b.c) >>}
µ(+) = {< $,m(+) >,< µ(a.&.b.c), µ(+.a.&.b.c) >,
< µ(a.b),m(+.a.b) >}
It can be easily checked that as before µ(s.t) = µ(s)(µ(t)) for all s, t ∈ S. The meaning m(a) of
a is arbitrary, but we would typically identify it with its logical value (true or false). Also, notice
that without loss of generality those a, b, c (and hence the language S) can be ”expanded” to sets
of variables ai, bj , ck, resulting in a slight change in the equations, but not changing the content of
the theorem. Then, for all pairs of variables disjunction and conjunction would behave as usual;
however for a combination of a variable with a Boolean formula they could behave arbitrarily. This
proves the first part.
We now prove the second part, i.e. that if the meaning functions are restricted to Boolean
polynomials, it is impossible to assign compositional semantics given by the ”natural” semantics of
(a+b)&c to expressions of the type a+(b&c) and preserve the original meanings of the connectives.
(The ”natural” semantics is of course the conjunction of the Boolean value of a+b with the Boolean
value of c).
The proof consists in observing that (m(a)+m(b))&m(c) cannot be obtained as a Boolean poly-
nomial (function) p(m(a),m(b)&m(c)). To see it, it is enough to construct a truth table showing
the values of (a+ b)&c and b&c and observing that there cannot be a functional dependence of the
former on the latter and the value of a (compare the values for the triples < a = 1, b = 0, c = 1 >
and < a = 1, b = 1, c = 0 >). ✷
5 Systematic semantics. II. Discussion
Above, we have argued that the existence of a homomorphism from syntax to semantics does not
restrict the grammar, but if we put some constraints on such a homomorphism, they actually might
restrict grammars of languages. We have called such homomorphisms (F-)systematic. However the
nature of systematicity seems to be very much an open problem. In this section we discuss some
of the most obvious issues, and propose some research possibilities in this area.
The first natural question that arises is: What should be this class F? We have shown that
for a grammar of numbers, and a grammar of two Boolean connectives the natural classes are
polynomials. Clearly, this cannot always be the case. For instance, it seems natural to map
verbs into predicates and nouns into their arguments. But we know that if we want to provide
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compositional semantics for more than the simplest case of subject-verb-object construction we
need other mechanism, e.g. type raising. On the other hand, unrestricted type raising leads to
the results we have just discussed. We arrive then at the following variant of the natural question:
How should we restrict type raising? (So that we can account e.g. for ellipsis, but at the same time
constrain the grammars).
Many grammatical constructions express meanings that go beyond expressing predicate-arguments
assignments. For example, ”the X-er, the Y-er” construction ([Fillmore et al.1988], [Zadrozny and Manaster-Ramer1994]),
as in ”the more you dive, the better you swim”, expresses a proportional dependence. Other con-
structions can express speech acts, various kind of conflict, etc., hence creating rich sets of meanings.
The next question we can ask is whether we can express constraints on the syntax-semantics in-
terface by saying that the homomorphism should be simple, relative to the the class of meaning
functions. A mathematical analogy would be to say that we are given many different functions,
e.g. sin(x), cos(x), ex, ..., but only simple ways of composing them, e.g. only by the +.
In essence, when we say that a function is F-systematic, we view F as a measure of complexity
and/or expressive power. Hence the natural association with polynomials. But there are other
measures of complexity. [Savitch1993] discusses grammars and languages in terms of Kolmogoroff
complexity, suggesting that more compact grammars are better even if they overgeneralize (e.g. by
approximating a finite language by an infinite one). We believe that his work is relevant for sys-
tematicity, but we do not have any formal argument supporting that claim, except the observation
that polynomials are more compact than functions defined by cases. So perhaps this might be a
beginning of a formal connection.
One of the referees has pointed out two other ideas. First, there could be other more natural
notions of systematicity, in cases when meanings are specified by means of constraint solving, as
is implicit in unification-based formalisms, and even in Theorem 1, where meanings are extracted
as solutions to equations. The second idea, the differences between natural and formal languages
notwithstanding, is a programming language semantics concept which actually restricts the ability
of a semantics to be compositional. This concept is ”full abstraction”, i.e. the equivalence between
the operational and denotational semantics, (cf. [Gunter1993]), which can be viewed as a general
constraint on compositionality.
A radically different approach to the interaction of syntax and semantics has been presented
in [Zadrozny and Manaster-Ramer1994] and [Jurafsky1992]. Language is modeled there as a set
of constructions (cf. also [Fillmore et al.1988] and [Bloomfield1933]). In that model there is no
separate syntax, since constructions encode both form and meaning. Each construction explicitly
defines the meaning function taking the meanings of its subconstructions as arguments. Intuitively,
in that model we assume that each word sense requires a separate semantic description; the same is
true about each idiom, open idiom ([Fillmore et al.1988]), and a phrasal construction. This means
that we make each semantic function as complicated as linguistically necessary, but their mode of
combination is restricted. (Continuing the above mathematical analogy, we would say that the only
mode of combination is substitution for an argument). In the construction-based model semantics
is ”compositional” and ”systematic” (with respect to the set of all these meaning functions), but
there is no homomorphism from syntax to semantics, because there is no syntax to speak of. It is
”compositional”, because the meaning of a construction is a function of the meanings of its parts
and their mode of combination. (Note that such a function is different for different constructions,
and each construction defines its own mode of combination). And it is systematic, because the
modes of combination are not arbitrary, as they have to be linguistically justified. But since only
few formal aspects of constructions have been worked out, we can only speak of that model as of
yet another possibility.
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The last point we want to make is that while it is true that the homomorphism condition is
too weak (in general) to count as systematicity, the semanticists (e.g. Montague) have not been
using arbitrary homomorphisms. Thus a careful examination of their work should lead to some
characterization of ”good” homomorphisms; and this seems to be another interesting avenue of
research. (As suggested by one of the referees, a technique from universal algebra might also prove
helpful, where one first gives a class of algebras and then specifies meanings as homomorphisms
from the initial algebra of the class).
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have shown the formal vacuity of the compositionality principle. That is, we have
shown that the property that the meaning of the whole is a function of the meanings of its parts does
not put any material constraints on syntax or semantics. Theorem 1 (and its corollaries) explain
formally why the postulate of a homomorphism between syntax and semantics is not restrictive
enough: the syntactic operator of concatenation ”.” can be mapped into functional composition
operating on functions that encode arbitrary semantics of an arbitrary language. As we have seen
in the examples, the presence of other operators does not change the result, because they can be
treated as yet another letter of the alphabet, and one can still produce a homomorphism between
syntax and semantics.
The problem of the vacuity of compositional semantics arises, because in the formal definition of
compositionality meaning functions can be completely arbitrary. Therefore we have proposed that
the meaning functions should be systematic, i.e., non-arbitrary. We have shown that this notion
makes sense formally; that is, we presented examples of semantic classes of functions, for which
there are grammars with meaning functions in that class, as well as we have shown that there are
grammars that cannot have a meaning function in that class. As we noted in the previous section,
both the formal and the linguistic nature of systematicity remains an open problem, but with a
few promising avenues of research.
In this paper we have restricted ourselves to the mathematics of compositionality, and many
important issues have not been discussed. For instance, the main result is relevant for theories
of grammar and for the thesis about the reduction of syntax to lexical meanings (cf. e.g. T.
Wasow on pp.204-205 in [Sells1985]). Also, systematicity of semantics should give us a handle
in constraining the power of the semantic as well as the syntactic components of a grammar (cf.
[Manaster-Ramer and Zadrozny1994]). Furthermore, our results have implications for computa-
tional linguistics (they are briefly discussed in [Zadrozny1992]).
Finally, the reader should note that one of the more bizarre consequences of Theorem 1 is
that we do not have to start building compositional semantics for natural language beginning with
assigning of the meanings to words. We can do equally well by assigning meanings to phonems or
even LETTERS, assuring that, for any sentence, the intuitive meaning we associate with it would
be a function of the meanings of the letters from which that sentence is composed. But then the
cabalists had always known it.
Acknowledgements. I would like to thank Alexis Manaster Ramer for our many discussions
of compositionality, and the referees for their insightful comments.
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